WHY IS THERE NO OFFICIAL HISTORY OF CCG?
I. Government’s Efforts to Commission an Official History
The initial reason for writing about the British Element of the Control Commission for Germany was that there did not appear to be an official record of its operations among the Government’s official histories. The closest thing seemed to be a partial account contained in the Royal Institute of International Affairs’ publication Four-Power Control in Germany and Austria 1945-1946, published as part of RIIA’s Survey of International Affairs 1939-1946. The lack of an official record may partially account for why the UK’s civilian contribution to West Germany’s post-war development has largely been overlooked, so this project attempts to fill the gap.
In fact, an official history of the Control Commission for Germany was envisaged from its inception, well before any personnel were deployed to Germany. On 8 February 1945 John Troutbeck at the Foreign Office wrote to General Stephen Kirby at the Control Commission’s London offices in response to a draft Directive Kirby had sent him the previous December.[1] The directive (copy not seen) had evidently called for a Historical Officer to assemble CCG documents and summarise them in the manner of a journal to provide a contemporary account of the Control Commission’s activities. The Foreign Office had no objection to this in principle but did not like the suggestion that the Historical Officer would also write an independent record of events. This, they considered, required a perspective which would be provided by the regular history when it came to be written.
In May the following year, the Cabinet Office, which was responsible for commissioning Official Histories of the war raised the question of a history of the Control Commission with the Control Office for Germany & Austria (COGA), the Department in London headed by the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, which was responsible for policy and direction of the Control Commission.[2] Principal Assistant Secretary Christopher Eastwood explained that, in addition to military histories, there was to be a set of civil histories covering the UK civilian war effort, as well as volumes about the military administration of occupied territories. The Control Commission’s history would be part of the series. Although an objective history could not be written until it was possible to see the events in perspective, he thought that it would be as well to appoint ‘narrators’ now to sift and the essential material from the voluminous records and organise it chronologically for a future historian. The War Office and Foreign Office agreed, and decided that, as there was no logical dividing line between the work of the Civil Affairs and the Control Commission, an account of both should be included in the Official Histories.[3] An historian should be appointed soon, as well as narrators in respect of both subjects. Reporting to COGA’s Permanent Secretary Gilmour Jenkins after the meeting, Maurice Dean suggested that Brigadier van Cutsem, whose name had been submitted to the Cabinet Office on 20 August 1945, should be appointed as a CCG narrator.[4]
Subsequently, the Cabinet Office decided that the Civil Affairs history should be the responsibility of the Chief Military Historian, while the Control Commission history should be treated separately by an historian appointed by COGA.[5] Agreeing to this proposal on 4 November, COGA said that they did not plan to appoint an historian until the summer of 1947, by which time a tranche of closed files would have been accumulated.[6]
Around the same time, On 24th May 1946, five days before the Cabinet Office’s letter, Sir Eric Bamford, Director General of the Central Office of Information (COI), approached COGA suggesting a booklet about the work of the Control Commission, which he described as “one of the major British contributions to the practical task of peace-making.”[7] He had in mind a publication to be sold on bookstalls, along the lines of “the First to be Freed”, which told the story of the military administration in Libya and Eritrea and suggested Graham Hutton as a possible author.[8] COGA concluded that there was a short-term need to inform public opinion in the UK and US about what CCG was doing, focused on a specific time period – perhaps the first 12 months; and a longer-term need for a scholarly historical account of the Control Commission and its work. COI could help with the former, although the editorial responsibility would impose a considerable burden on COGA which was a serious drawback but “we must face it”. COGA wrote to COI accordingly on 20 June 1946.[9]
Alongside, although not mentioned during these exchanges the Control Commission had already sought to communicate its work to the British public with an exhibition in London’s Oxford Street between June and August 1946 called Germany Under Control. The aim of the exhibition, proposed by General Sir Brian Robertson, then Deputy Military Governor, was to enlighten the British public about “the problems and tasks of the Control Commission for Germany”, thereby meeting the demand from both Parliament and from a sceptical public for more information about what was going on in Germany under British occupation, which was costing British taxpayers around £80 million a year.[10] In Germany, meanwhile, the Control Commission’s Records and Archives Section, which had been formed in September 1944 before CCG was deployed to Germany, was already collecting material for an eventual official history.[11]
But by July 1949 enthusiasm for a popular booklet about the Control Commission had waned. Sir Eric Seal at the Treasury wrote to Sir Robert Fraser at COI that it seemed very doubtful whether there would be a big demand for a booklet since the subject was not one which had aroused popular interest[Dg1] in the same way as wartime themes such as Battle of Britain and Bomber Command had done.[12] Sir Robert agreed. He thought it would be wise to abandon the idea that a Bomber Command could be constructed out of such material. The war-time books were all blessed with an intense public interest in their subjects, and with exciting narratives of violent action, and an incomparable wealth of arresting photographic material. One could just not get a book of that special kind out of the Control Commission’s work. Such a book would be lucky to sell 5000 copies and the costs would be prohibitive. Sir Eric Seal wrote to Sir Brian Robertson reporting that in view of Sir Robert Fraser’s views, and the present need for economy, Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick felt that the project must be dropped.[13]
In Germany they were coming round to the same view. In August 1949, Major General Wansborough-Jones, CCG Chief Administration Officer, wrote to his colleague, Major General K G McLean saying that, at a meeting in Berlin the previous week, the question of a history of CCG had been discussed, and it was felt that, unless a really readable history was produced, written by a well-known author “such as Hilary St John Saunders”, the proposal was bound to be a flop.[14] In any case, Wansborough-Jones explained, the Royal Institute of International Affairs (Chatham House) were now preparing a comprehensive history, and he thought the matter should be left to them, culling the information they needed from CCG’s Monthly Reports.[15] A year later, in November 1950, a note from Mr A D Wilson to Mr Anderson, recorded that a former colleague, Anthony Marreco, was covering the period 1945-1947 for Chatham House. He suggested that Mr Marreco should be given assistance by staff of the High Commission, in the interests of ensuring his account was as clear and objective as possible and attached a draft letter to the High Commissioner’s Chief of Staff to this effect.[16] This, it seems, marked the end of the Government’s commitment to an Official History of CCG.
In an intriguing postscript, Brigadier Van Cutsem’s 1947 draft account of CCG’s genesis and development, came to light in November 1949 among papers found in the course of tidying up” by a Mr J L Simpson. Comments on the draft were also attached, but the author/s were not named, and there was no final version incorporating the comments, nor any indication of what happened next[Dg2] .
II. RIIA Survey of International Affairs:
Four-Power Control in Germany & Austria 1945-1946
At the end of 1947 Frank Ashton-Gwatkin retired from the Foreign Office, where he had played a key role in the setting up of CCG, and joined Chatham House to work with its Director, Arnold J Toynbee on the preparation of the Royal Institute of International Affairs’ (RIIA) Survey of International Affairs covering the years 1939-1946. One of Ashton-Gwatkins’ tasks was to identify potential contributors.
In May 1949, on the recommendation of G H G Anderson in the Foreign Office German Department, Ashton-Gwatkin engaged Anthony Marrecco to write the section covering Allied Control of Germany from 1945-1946.[17] Marrecco was a 33-year-old Barrister who had been a junior prosecution counsel at Nuremburg; and subsequently Acting Director of CCG’s Governmental Structure Branch from 1946-49. However, he did not make good progress, and by February 1952 had still not delivered the manuscript. Marrecco then asked for an advance of his fee to enable him to pay for a secretary/researcher, claiming that pressure of other work was preventing him from devoting the necessary time to the task. This was refused, and on February 18 1952 Toynbee sought a guarantee from Marrecco that he would complete the work by the end of the year, failing which Chatham House would have to look elsewhere to get the work done. Marrecco’s reply did not give such a guarantee, so Toynbee wrote on 29 February 1952 to terminate the contract.
In November 1952 Chatham House engaged the historian Michael Balfour[18] to take over the Survey. It seems to have been an inspired appointment: Balfour was then Chief Information Officer at the Board of Trade, and had been CCG(BE)’s Director of Public Relations & Information Services from 1945-47. The Foreign office confirmed on 20 November 1952 that it had no objections to Balfour’s appointment, “although it would be as well if we had a look at the manuscript prior to publication”, and Toynbee wrote to Balfour on 25 November that the way was now clear for him to seek permission from the Board of Trade to undertake the work, which he hoped would be plain sailing.
A year later, Balfour had delivered the first draft, and Toynbee wrote to him on 30 December 1953, evidently delighted, to say that he had read the typescript over Christmas and his anticipations had been more than fulfilled. Following a lengthy period of review by numerous members of the great and good suggested by Balfour himself, the final manuscript was delivered to the once more delighted Toynbee, who wrote on September 14 1954 to say that he had spent a most enjoyable weekend reading it and wanted to send his thanks and congratulations. He declared that it was just what he had hoped for – it provided a picture of all the different facets of the Occupation and would be a notable volume in the series.
But the Foreign Office was less pleased, objecting to certain passages critical of Government policy. There is no written record in the Chatham House folder of the passages concerned, so it seems likely that they were discussed during meetings or on the telephone. Balfour wrote on 12 December 1954 to Passant (Head of the Foreign Office Research Department, who had written FO’s original 20.11.52 ‘no objection’ letter), following up a conversation they had had a few days before. He said he understood that the FO’s objection was not that his criticisms overlooked salient facts, or were unreasonably expressed, but simply that, as a serving civil servant, it was improper for him to criticise the past actions of the British or any other Government. If that were the position, it was surely clear that “nobody with any pretensions to being a responsible historian would agree to write on such terms”. He certainly would not wish to put his name to the book if all criticisms of that kind had to be eliminated before it could be published. He hoped that, as no warning had been given of the likelihood of such a condition being imposed, the FO would feel able to reconsider its attitude.
On 18 February 1955, Toynbee wrote to say that he had reviewed Balfour’s comments on the FO’s markings of the script, and broadly agreed with them. [19] He had paid particular attention to Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick’s[20] points which, fortunately, were not the crux. It was the long passages, “marked by some sub-Brahmin” which they were being asked to cut out or water down (again, there is no record of these in the folder). Toynbee felt, as Balfour did, that this could be done without reducing the book to a state where neither Balfour, nor Chatham house or the Rockefeller Foundation would care to see it published. [21]
At some point Toynbee evidently spoke with Kirkpatrick, because he wrote a 4-page letter to him on 1 March 1955, referring to their talk ‘the other day’, and referred to ‘running through the script together’. He began by emphasising the trouble Balfour had taken to consider the FO’s comments, and that he, Toynbee, had then reviewed all the points with Balfour, and had arrived at a revised version which took particular note of Kirkpatrick’s personal comments, and had made changes to accommodate 6 of the 8 points he had made[22]. He explained that, in the case of other FO comments, they had made a number of changes; but that there were other passages where it had been more difficult, for example where they were being asked to omit mention of material facts that were also well-known, e.g. the dismissal of Dr Adenauer by the British; or to cut or water down passages where opinions were being expressed e.g. about the volatility of the American temperament or aspects of German middle-class mentality. Toynbee said that, while all opinions were disputable, Balfour’s views were widely held, and did not strike him as either startling or eccentric. Moreover, they were intrinsic to an intelligible account of the story.
Toynbee then exerted some pressure. He was anxious to avoid, as he was sure Kirkpatrick was, reaching appoint at which the author, Chatham House and the Rockefeller Foundation might feel they could not publish the book if the FO were to insist on expurgation of what might seem like essential statements of fact and expressions of opinion. The difficulty of Balfour being a civil servant was appreciated, but FO had said at the outset that they had no objections to his appointment. Chatham House had assumed that the only point of concern to FO would be to ensure that Balfour had not made inadvertent use of confidential material, and there had been no warning that the script would be considered from a quite different point of view.
Toynbee said he had been trying to think of a solution satisfactory to all. In any event they would be making fairly considerable changes to meet FO’s comments and would be ready to go through these with FO and do their best to reach a final text. But this might lead to an impasse or, if that were avoided, to a final text that would implicate the FO, who could hardly disclaim responsibility for a text to which they had insisted on extensive changes. He suggested that an alternative was that FO should not require to see the script again, and that Chatham House should include in the preface a statement that Balfour had written the book in his private capacity, and that his being a civil servant did not imply any official approval.
Kirkpatrick replied four weeks later on 28 March 1955. The Foreign Office could not accept the suggestion that publication could proceed without agreeing a final text. To underline his case, he enclosed extracts from the Civil Service Establishment Code (which then governed civil servants’ conduct and conditions of service). Kirkpatrick grudgingly accepted the proposed rewording of the preface but insisted that FO officials must review the next draft, although he thought that, with goodwill on both sides, it need not prove impossible to agree on a final text for publication. He did not respond to Toynbee’s point that, by agreeing to the final text, FO would be implicated in and unable to avoid responsibility for what was published. Reading between the lines, FO was now ruing the blithe ‘no objections’ by Passant at the outset and wanted to close the matter down as quickly and quietly as possible.
Whether or not this is so, the Chatham House folder then falls silent. The RIIA Survey of International Affairs: Four-Power Control in Germany & Austria 1945-1946 was finally published byn Oxford University Press in 1956, and the published text reveals that strenuous efforts had been made to accommodate the Foreign Office’s concerns and includes a statement that Balfour’s official background “should not be taken to imply official approval of his views”. No other official history of CCG was published.
Footnotes
[1] 8.2.45 Letter from JM Troutbeck, FO, to General SW Kirby, Control Commission for Germany. National Archives File FO941/7
[2] 29.5.46 Letter from Christopher Eastwood, Cabinet Office, to RMC (Mark) Turner, COGA. National Archives File FO941/7
[3] Civil Affairs organisations were designed to ensure that basic civil order and welfare were maintained in those allied and enemy states encountered on operations during the Second World War. This enabled military commanders to focus on defeating enemy forces without being distracted by possible civilian problems.
[4] Brigadier William Edward Cutsem OBE, MC. Served in World War I and later in military intelligence with the Foreign Office. From mid-1942 transferred to the War Office to work on Post Hostilities Planning and subsequently appointed to the Control Commission in Germany until he retired in December 1945.
[5] Civil Affairs and Military Government in North-West Europe by F S V Donnison CBE was published by Her Majesty’s Stationery Office in 1961 as part of the Government’s Official History of the Second World War series.
[6] 4.11.46 Letter from Maurice Dean, COGA, to Christopher Eastwood, Cabinet Office National Archives File FO941/7
[7] 24.5.46 Letter from Sir Eric Bamford, COI to COGA National Archived File FO945/529
[8] Author and economist. Teacher at the London School of Economics and Assistant Editor, The Economist. From 1939-45 he worked at the Foreign Office and the Ministry of Information. In 1955 he helped to establish the Institute of Economic Affairs.
[9] 20.6.46 Maurice Dean, COGA, to Sir Eric Bamford, COI. National Archives File FO945/529
[10] 2.7.2007 Christopher Knowles blog How it Really Was
[11] 8.8.46 Letter from Major General S W Kirby, CCG, to Maurice Dean, COGA National Archives File FO941/7
[12] 1.7.49 Letter from Sir Eric Seal to Sir Robert Fraser. National Archives File FO945/529
[13] 19.9.49 Letter from Sir Eric Seal to Sir Brian Robertson. National Archives File FO936/659
[14] Hilary St George Saunders was a British author who served on Admiral Mountbatten’s staff during WWII and became known for his books and pamphlets, such as The Battle of Britain, Bomber Command, and Coastal Command.
[15] 27.8.49 Letter from Maj Gen Wansborough-Jones, CAO CCG to Maj Gen K G McLean, COS 82HQ CCG(BE) Berlin. National Archives File FO936/665
[16] 13.11.50 Letter from A D Wilson to Anderson National Archives File FO936/665
[17] Letter dated 17.3.49 from G H G Anderson to F Ashton-Gwatkin
[18] Michael Balfour, historian and public servant. Director of CCG Public Relations & Information Services 1945-47. Professor of European History, University of East Anglia 1966-74. Author of many books including Four-Power Control in Germany and Austria 1945-46, The Kaiser and His Times, West Germany, Propaganda in War 1939- 45; Britain and Joseph Chamberlain, Withstanding Hitler in Germany 1933-45.
[19] The Chatham House folder contains the original copy of the letter, so we cannot be sure that Balfour received it; but as they were due to meet the following Monday it may be that they discussed its contents, and the letter was never formally delivered.
[20] British High Commissioner to Germany 1950-1953, Foreign Office Permanent Under Secretary 1953
[21] Chatham House’s ‘sister foundation’ in America, which was funding Balfour’s work
[22] One of the other two was Field Marshal Montgomery’s statement, before leaving Germany, in May 1946, that three-quarters of the population were hard-bitten Nazis. Balfour’s reference to his authority for the statement was abbreviated. In fact, the statement was attributed to Montgomery by Sir Arthur Street in evidence to the Select Committee on Estimates 30.5.46 when he was Permanent Secretary at COGA. The record was public, so it was intended to retain the statement, but give the reference in full. The second point was Kirkpatrick’s ‘No’ written against the statement that ‘things were considerably improved in 1947 when Lord Pakenham, on being appointed to replace Mr Hynd, combined the functions of a Junior Minister in the Foreign Office with responsibility for the Control Office. Toynbee could not remember from their discussion whether Kirkpatrick was saying that the statement of fact was wrong, or whether he was contesting that ‘things were considerably improved’.
[Dg1]An indication of public attitudes towards CCG
[Dg2]Follow up