Unfavourable comparisons were often made between the size of CCG and its American equivalent, OMGUS (Office of the United States Military Governor),[1] although contemporary observers like Michael Balfour maintained that the two organisations were organised and structured differently, precluding valid comparisons[2].  The records would appear to support this view.  National Archives file FO936/263 contains three documents which record CCG’s attempts to compare the size and functions of the two organisations, and to justify the difference. 

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1.          FIGURES OF US ADMINISTRATION STAFF IN BERLIN AND THE US ZONE

 

Undated paper submitted to the Select Committee on Estimates Sub-Committee E

 

Figures obtained from OMGUS in Berlin:

 

US Zone        Berlin     TOTAL

1.1.46         275,620         3,768    279,388

1.6.46         104,989         3,368    108,357

 

Notes

1. Figures include all US (but no German) personnel, except Combat Units.  They include, therefore not only Military Government personnel, but also service troops and specialist units which serve both Military Government and the Forces of Occupation, together with all Headquarters down to and including Divisional Headquarters.

2. In the US organisation the distinction between the forces of occupation and the administrative staffs is less clear cut than in the British organisation, and many services such as the Intelligence service and the welfare service serve both occupying forces and Military Government and are under one Ministry, i.e. War Department.

3. It has not been possible to obtain the figures of German personnel employed by US Military Government.  It is known, however, that a very considerable number of Germans are employed, and furthermore that Germans are filling a number of positions which we would consider unsuitable at the present stage.

 

2.         COMPARATIVE FIGURES CCG(BE) AND OMGUS

 

23.12.46 letter from Brigadier Armytage, Office of Chief Administrative Officer CCG to G D Kirwan, COGA Director of Establishments

 

On 23 December 1946 Brigadier Armytage in the office of the Chief Administration Officer in Berlin reported back on the results of the extensive exercise he had undertaken in cooperation with the Americans.  The short answer, he believed, was that the US and UK responsibilities, and their respective outlooks on them were so different, that no meaningful comparison of figures would be of any value.  The letter then explains the reasons for this, and provides tables showing the OMGUS and CCG projected strengths at 1.1.47, broken down and the US and UK outlook 

 

Main points:

• A simple comparison of figures would be of no value: CCG’s responsibilities – and outlook on them – were so different from those of OMGUS that figures meant nothing

• The American job was simple compared to UK’s.  They did not have the Ruhr; the heavy industries; the densely populated areas; and a sea-board.  It was child-play for the Americans to hurry on the process of handing over as much as possible to the Germans in the shortest possible time

• Taking population as a basis for comparison, the population of the US Zone was 16¼ millions as compared with 22¾ millions in the British Zone, so it could be said that strength of OMGUS should be roughly two-thirds of our CCG(BE) total

• Despite many hours spent with the Americans in Berlin it had not been possible to get a functional comparison as suggested by Sir Gilmour Jenkins.[3]  OMGUS HQ in Berlin has not got the breakdown of functional divisions in the Länder, more extensive devolution of power to the Länder being one of the major differences between the US and UK approaches

• Tables A & B set out the personnel strengths as at 1.1.47 of OMGUS and CCG.  In making a comparison the following should be taken into account:

a)  US armed forces are responsible for all operational and counter-intelligence; OMGUS is only responsible for evaluating that intelligence to its own needs.  The strength of CCG’s Intelligence Division (including Censorship Branch composed mostly of Allied nationals paid by HMG), totalling 3,500 should therefore be deducted;

b)  The US Army is for all practical purposes responsible for PW/DPs[4]  and CCG’s 600 personnel should be deducted on this account;

c)  There did not appear to be an OMGUS equivalent to our:

• Car Organisation                2,200

• LAU[5]                                           2,400

• “T” Force                                1,900

all of whose duties, if performed, were carried out by the US Army.  These numbers should therefore be deducted;

d)  There was no American equivalent to:

• North German Coal Control         500

• North German Oil Control              50

both of which should also be deducted from CCG’s total.

e)  The Americans were claiming no reparations and were throwing up very little in their Zone, neither were they concerned with unilateral deliveries; CCG’s RDR[6] Division were also, unlike OMGUS, liquidating a large amount of Wehrmacht stores for the German economy, on which basis it would be reasonable to deduct some sixty percent or 250 from RD&R Division before making the comparison.  

• The deductions suggested above would total approximately 11,400 which, deducted from CCG’s 24,800 left a balance of 13,400.  After factoring in the population difference, this figure would come down to 8,900.  Bearing in mind our different approach to the problem, and the vast differences economically between the two Zones, this did not appear to compare unfavourably with the American figure of 5,000.

 

Table A.                  OMGUS STRENGTHS AT 1 JANUARY 1947

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TABLE B.               STRENGTH CCG (BE) AS AT 1ST JANUARY 1947

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3.         STRENGTH OF OMGUS

 

12.9.47  Note by ‘PMJ’, British Consulate, Bremen

 

• PMJ understands that the total strength of OMGS is about one-third of the UK Military Government.  Reasons include:

  • Almost all subordinate clerical posts are filled by Germans

  • All ‘housekeeping’ services, such as messing and billeting has been handed over to the Army

  • No provision of recreational and welfare services except those run by or for the Army, so

  • OMGUS officers have no responsibility other than governing Germany

• PMJ is critical of some aspects of the US approach, but has praise for the Americans because:

  • It does not seem that there are many Military Government Officers who are in Germany to have a good time, nor is there much inducement in that direction;

  • In contrast with the British, home leave is infrequent and recreational facilities more limited

  • Instances of scandalous conduct have been noticeably absent (although their wives seem to be unable to resist the temptations of the black market)

• The Army has complete control over requisitioning but there has been no indication that it has exploited its position for its own benefit. On the contrary, derequistioning has been pressed with the utmost rigour, often at the expense of the convenience of the occupying forces:

  • The number of clubs has been cut, freeing the buildings to be handed over to the German Economy

  • A large part of the Haus des Reiches, which is the OMGUS office, has been handed over to German government offices

 

[1] See, for example, the House of Commons debate on 29.7.46 (Hansard HC Deb 29 July 1946 vol 426 cc526-640)

[2] Michael Balfour Four-Power Control in Germany and Austria 1945-1946 p102

[3] Permanent Secretary, Foreign Office German Section

[4] Prisoners of War/Displaced Persons

[5] Local Administration Unit, which supervised CCG’s German employees

[6] Reparation, Dismantling and [Restitution?]