Introduction

 

CCG personnel numbers fluctuated greatly throughout its short existence, reflecting its perpetually changing functions. The statistics are startling: from 598 in September 1944, CCG personnel rose to a peak of nearly 26,000 by January 1947; before falling to around 4,000 by the beginning of 1950. This chapter records the efforts of CCG, first to fill the huge number of jobs required at the outset; and then to shed them as the Control Commission’s work came to an end.  The graph below provides an overview; more detailed figures are tabulated at Appendix A.

 

In 1944, it seemed that the Americans and Russians expected the Control Commission to be composed largely of military personnel, but British plans were always for a civilian organisation, albeit with many posts designated dual military/civilian and filled by the military at the outset. [1]   CCG was progressively civilianised, evolving from a predominantly military workforce (78% in January 1946) to an almost wholly civilian one (98% in January 1950).  As discussed on page 16, this would later lead to criticisms about the size of CCG compared to its American counterpart, the Office of the US Military Governor, OMGUS.      

 

The planning assumption had been that, after Germany’s defeat, there would still be central government Ministries in place with whom, in collaboration with the other Allies, CCG HQ staff in Berlin would work to develop and oversee the implementation of new policies for a democratic post-war Germany.  Early CCG manpower estimates were constructed on this basis, envisaging an HQ of a mere 500-600 staff, with a further 3,ooo-4,000 in regional government[2].  The revelation, in early 1945, of the total collapse of German central Government changed all that[3].

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Source: Quarterly Report of the UK High Commissioner for Germany No. 1, 1951

 

Planning

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Although Occupation planning had started as early as 1943, detailed preparations for the Control Commission began only in July 1944, when Major General S W Kirby was appointed as one of two Deputy Commissioners,[4] and assembled a small Establishment & Recruiting Staff in Norfolk House.[5]  As the plans were gradually firmed up, the relevant UK Departments were asked for nominations to head CCG’s Divisions and Branches, which had been designed to align with the structure and functions of the German central government (see Appendix A to Section 2, CCG Organisation & Functions).  By early September 1944, the Heads of the Economic, Transportation and Finance Divisions were in place; and several Branch Directors or Deputy Directors had been appointed (see Table below), who then became responsible for estimating their own personnel requirements, differentiated between those required at the planning stage, and the greater number who would be needed for the ‘impact’ phase, after CCG’s deployment to Germany. Posts could be specified as military, civilian or either. 

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Source: Appendix A to 2nd Progress Report by the Deputy Commissioner (Military) 5th September 1944.  National Archives File FO1005/1634

 

Approval for each Division’s ‘establishment’ then had to be obtained from the War Establishments Committee (WEC) through a process involving both the War Office (WO) and the Treasury.[6]   This could take many weeks: for example, staffing proposals for the CCG Censorship Bureau, submitted to WO and Treasury in December 1944, were not agreed by WEC until February 1945, and were not approved by the Treasury until March.  Even the proposals for the Military Governor’s personal office took more than a month to approve.[7] 

 

Moreover, the Control Commission’s requirements had to be formulated in a fluid and rapidly developing situation.  For instance, increasing awareness of the magnitude of the legal problems the Control Commission would be facing in Germany meant upgrading the Legal Branch to a Legal Division; and decisions about the Control Commission’s top structure could not be taken until agreement was reached with the Russians and Americans about the overall machinery of Allied control. The Cabinet Armistice and Post -War Committee (APW), chaired by Deputy Prime Minister Attlee accepted that adjustments would be required, and that what was laid down on paper could be altered later at the Foreign Office’s discretion.[8]

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Filling Posts

 

The top posts were initially filled through informal contacts between the Control Commission Directors and Deputy Directors and their colleagues in other Government Departments, and the practice appears to have continued, tolerated by the Treasury, for Division Chiefs, Branch Directors and their and Deputies.  The Control Commission regarded this as the only practical method of rapidly building up the mass of specialised personnel it needed and suggested that there should be a ‘rear link’ to maintain these personal contacts after CCG’s deployment to Germany, to ensure that recruiters took technical and functional requirements fully into account.[9]

 

But the Control Commission struggled from the outset to secure the bulk of the personnel it needed: initially these were the technical and other specialists; later, the middle-ranking and junior executive, clerical and support grades.  Deputy Commissioner Ivone Kirkpatrick’s suggestion to offer a leaving gratuity as an incentive was swiftly turned down as impracticable by the Treasury: “the bribe could not be made high enough”.[10]  General Kirby, his fellow Deputy Commissioner, had warned in September 1944 that, unless Ministers accorded CCG a very high priority, and the “normal machinery” was accelerated, it would be impossible to find staff of the necessary calibre and in sufficient numbers to carry out the very onerous task of “controlling the German people”.  He was right: his April 1945 Progress Report cites the lack of key personnel as one of the four main deficiencies handicapping CCG’s effectiveness.[11],[12]

 

At the end of July 1945, when the Control Commission was deployed to Germany, only 64% of the required posts were filled. That figure might appear to represent reasonable progress from a standing start less than a year previously, but it meant that, in practice, vital functions were seriously understaffed: the Intelligence Group, critical to denazification, by 52%; and Economic, Finance and Transport Divisions by between 44-49%.   At end of October, CCG numbers stood at 8,792 but, by then, the requirement had risen to 12,953, and key Divisions such as Transport, Political, and Intelligence were still seriously short of personnel.  In January 1946 Commander-in-Chief Field Marshal Montgomery wrote that unless drastic action was taken, the organisation responsible for the control of Germany “would break”.[13]  Efforts to fill positions became increasingly fraught, involving high-level exchanges between Ministers, Generals and Permanent Secretaries.

 

An autonomous Control Service?

 

General Kirby had foreseen at the outset that, without some assurance about CCG’s long-term prospects, there would be difficulties in obtaining volunteers, especially from among those who already had a satisfactory job or good prospects of securing one upon demobilisation; and that compulsion to further government service would not be an option after the end of hostilities.  He therefore advocated the formation of a stand-alone Control Service “of considerable efficiency” with terms, and a form of contract, which would attract particularly the technical experts required to support and ultimately replace military Civil Affairs personnel and demobilised technical experts[14].  It is not known whether he had a particular model in mind – perhaps the Indian Civil Service? - but such a body, ring-fenced from the rest of the Civil Service, would perhaps have been able to operate a more flexible personnel regime, tailored to the task and conditions in Germany, and able to offer a measure of security and prestige, as well as attractive remuneration arrangements.  Perhaps the idea was never seriously considered: it seems unlikely that either the Foreign Office or the Treasury would willingly have relinquished control of the Government’s foremost post-war foreign policy enterprise costing very large amounts of taxpayers’ money in times of severe austerity.  In any event the proposal was turned down[15].

 

The ‘Normal Machinery’

 

Having rejected the proposal for an autonomous service, the Control Commission had to fall back on what General Kirby described as the ‘normal machinery’.  There were essentially three sources of potential recruits for CCG: civil servants already serving in Government Departments (internal transfers); the military; and the external labour market.  Each of these was governed by war-time priorities and constraints beyond the Commission’s control.  Since military personnel could not be made available until released from their war-time engagements, the immediate choice was between internal Government transfers, controlled by the Treasury, and external recruitment, controlled by the Ministry of Labour and National Service (MoLNS).  While the Treasury had turned a blind eye to informal contacts being used to fill the topmost posts, they were not prepared to allow the Control Commission to bypass the proper procedures to obtain the bulk of its personnel.  This meant that the Control Commission was prohibited from approaching Departments directly: all requests for staff had to be channelled through the Treasury, which controlled and operated the ‘normal machinery’. As described in Appendix B, this required Government Departments to inform the Treasury of volunteers available for release; the details of suitable candidates would then be forwarded to CCG.  There were no powers to direct personnel if volunteers were not forthcoming[16].  Unsurprisingly, progress in filling Control Commission positions was painfully protracted - “[it] beats in slowness almost any other process of Government and that is saying something”[17] – and CCG quietly continued to make informal approaches through their contacts in Departments, which infuriated both the Treasury and MoLNS.

 

Internal Transfers

 

The main problem with internal transfers was that Government Departments were, understandably, reluctant to release their staff, especially their best staff.  There were many other legitimate demands on their resources at that stage of the war, including the continuing war with Japan and the looming prospect of post-war reconstruction in the UK. [18]  The Treasury had warned that Departments would not release men of requisite calibre unless a high priority was accorded to Control Commission appointments so, in September 1944, the Foreign Secretary wrote to the Chancellor of the Exchequer proposing that Departments should be told of the high priority the Government attached to the Commissions in Germany and Austria, and should be directed to treat claims on their personnel accordingly.[19],[20]  The Chancellor’s response was less than whole-hearted. [21]   He agreed with the need for men and women[22] of the necessary calibre “for this important work”, and was willing for Departments to accord a high priority to release civil servants for Commission posts as far as circumstances allowed (author’s italics), but then cautioned that the continuing war in Europe, the Far East and post-war UK reconstruction, as well as demands for contributions to UNRRA (United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration) would affect Departments’ ability to respond.

 

No formal instruction or guidance to Departments followed and, over the next five months, Control Commission officials continued their increasingly frustrated exchanges with the Treasury about staffing.  Appendix B provides a flavour of these.  Not until five months later, in February 1945, did the Chancellor of the Exchequer finally write to his Ministerial colleagues asking them to accord priority to finding staff for the Commissions.[23]  It is a good letter, saying that, if the full results of victory are to be assured, it is essential to have the strongest possible organisation to control … the administration of the conquered territories.  He hopes that even the most hard-pressed Departments will be ready to co-operate.  The number required is but a small proportion of the Civil Service and he cannot not believe it is beyond their power to meet this call on resources.  CCG numbers did begin to increase significantly from March 1945 onwards, although it is questionable how much this was due to the Treasury’s intervention: other factors will also have played a part, in particular the post-war release of military personnel, and the run-down of war-time industries.  

 

CCG’s difficulties cannot entirely be blamed on Treasury foot-dragging. Responsibility for assigning priorities between war-time objectives rested, not with the Treasury, whose prime concern, as always, was control of public expenditure, but at political level, with the War Cabinet. CCG’s problems might, perhaps, have been resolved more quickly had they been raised to political level earlier, but the extent of their difficulties did not become widely apparent until early 1945, with the realisation that the total collapse of Germany’s central government would mean a hefty increase in the Control Commission’s requirements.   Moreover, even if the Control Commission had been accorded a higher priority, the ‘normal machinery’ – both for approving requirements and recruiting personnel – was, arguably, too slow and cumbersome to find and appoint such a large number of qualified people within a very few months. 

 

Lower level staff

 

In January 1945, with deployment to Germany looming, the challenge of obtaining the large number of lower level staff - the clerks, typists, and other support staff who would be vital to the Control Commission’s operations in Germany was also becoming urgent.  These staff would constitute a large proportion of Control Commission personnel, as they did in most Government Departments and large organisations at that time.  In the days before personal computers and internet communications, business could only be transacted through the efforts of such staff to take dictation, type and copy letters and reports , make telephone connections, process forms, and carry and file papers.  Estimating the overall requirement for such staff seems, however, to have to have defeated those responsible:  as late as July 1945, the Control Office for Germany and Austria (COGA) admitted that there was no list of vacancies, and could not give even approximate numbers. 

 

Trawls of Government Departments resulted in substantial numbers of volunteers from lower-level staff in provincial offices - London-based staff were not permitted to apply, since London offices were themselves severely short-staffed. By the end of January 1945, a total of 5,228 applications had been received, including from the Ministries of: Supply 1,754; War Transport 518; Home Security 65; Production 61; Health 308; Pensions 242[24].   At this distance, it is difficult to guess applicants’ motives but, whatever they were, Departments could not or would not release them.  An entire file is filled with letter after courteous letter from Departments explaining that they were themselves understaffed and could not release staff without replacement, often pleading that they were also engaged in high priority and/or expanding fields of work.[25]  The letters provide the dispiriting subtext to the high-level exchanges described in the earlier paragraphs.

 

Once more, Control Commission Divisions sought to obtain the staff they needed through their personal contacts. Initially, clerks and typists were assigned to CCG Divisions by parent Departments in London before being posted to the Control Commission until, under a revised arrangement introduced in November 1945, it was decided that the staff should be deployed directly to Germany, and allocated to Divisions on arrival.  This did not go down well: many junior appointees were only willing to go to if they were guaranteed a post in the Division that had appointed them.  Essential as they were, the Control Commission bowed to the inevitable and agreed that recruits could be ‘earmarked’ for the Divisions which had recruited them, so that they would not be deployed elsewhere[26].

 

The problem of obtaining lower level staff continued, even after recruitment problems for other categories of staff had receded.  In July 1945 COGA wrote to the Treasury asking them ‘again’ to make a special effort to recruit clerical and typing grades: of the 150 clerks and 200 typists whose release was still being sought, the Commission’s average weekly intake was only about 8 clerks and 6 short-hand typists.  And the demand was increasing: the Economic Division, which had already received 120 clerks and 140 typing grades, was now demanding a further 150 clerks and 150 typists.[27]

 

In January 1946 Field Marshal Montgomery himself weighed in, to complain that there seemed to be no solution in sight to the problem of obtaining clerical, typing and essential administrative staff to replace the Service personnel currently performing these duties, who would have “practically disappeared” by the early Spring, presumably because of demobilisation.  Civilian reinforcements were averaging 100 per month, but only 10% of these were typists, against a requirement of 50%.  There was a deficiency of almost 8,000 to make up by July 1946.[28]

 

External recruitment

 

As early as August 1944 General Kirby had raised the possibility of public advertisement to recruit people from outside Government such as “business men, manufacturers and other officials for the Economic Division, and University Dons or Schoolmasters who might well be valuable in the Education Branch”.  Kirby thought that, in view of the urgency, this might be the best approach, even though they might receive a lot of applications from people who were useless, but who would nevertheless have to be interviewed “to separate the sheep from the goats”.[29]  Treasury’s response was to refer him to the Ministry of Labour & National Service (MoLNS), which had war-time powers to direct men and women to work in the armed forces, civil defence or industry.[30]  MoLNS maintained three registers (see the Box below), to whom employers – including the Control Commission – could apply for the staff they needed.

 

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MoLNS’s Central Register was therefore the source of the professional staff whom the Commission most urgently needed to recruit. As previously described, the majority of such staff had initially been obtained from Government Departments but, in the light of the revelation that there might be no central German Government, and that CCG would be facing “a situation of chaos and destruction”, the Control Commission suddenly had to produce up to 800 technical and scientific staff by 1st April 1945, the bulk of whom were required for the Economic Divisions[Dg1]  to take on the work of the former German Ministries.[31]  Since MoLNS could not be expected to meet the demand in time, they were asked, in February 1945, to allow the CCG to approach industrialists directly in order to enlist their aid in producing “the right type of man…[because] the personal touch might be more productive than the official machine.”[Dg2]   MoLNS rejected the request, reminding the Commission that CCG did not currently enjoy priority over other Government requirements.[Dg3] [32] 

 

This unhelpful response provoked Deputy Commissioner Ivone Kirkpatrick to complain to Foreign Secretary Bevin that, while the Crimea Conference (Yalta) had decided to treat Germany as a high priority, this fact did not appear to have filtered through the Government machine.  He reported that MoLNS had threatened to obstruct any attempts made to obtain technical and scientific experts for the Control Commission and had stated that, even if men volunteered and their firms agreed to release them, MoLNS would not allow them to be taken on so long as there remained an unsatisfied need anywhere in industry or Government service which now enjoyed priority.  An irate Kirkpatrick told Bevin “…[T]he government must decide what importance is to be attached to the Commission.  I am prepared to accept the ruling, but I do not think it fair to hold me responsible [for] formulating the Commission on an adequate footing, and at the same time to tell me that the Ministry of Labour will make it their business to obstruct the necessary recruitment.[Dg4] ”[33]  Kirkpatrick was being economical with the truth: the meeting minutes do not actually record MoLNS’s representative, Reginald Luce[34], using the word ‘obstruct’ but Kirkpatrick, known to be temperamental and outspoken, was not afraid of raising the stakes[35].   

 

Prompted by Kirkpatrick’s complaints, Sir Alexander Cadogan, Foreign Office Permanent Under Secretary, then wrote to Sir Godfrey Ince, his MoLNS opposite number, to ask whether the statements reported by Kirkpatrick represented the Department’s policy. It would be “especially grave” if there were obstacles in the way of recruiting technical and scientific staff, because these were the personnel needed for the military and industrial demobilisation of Germany[Dg5] .[36]  Disappointingly, the file does not contain Sir Godfrey’s reply and, in the end, it was the military rather than the private sector that filled the gap.

 

Military recruitment

 

At the end of 1945 the Control Commission began recruiting from the three Services[37].  Service personnel due for release could apply for secondment to the Control Commission or, on demobilisation, for appointment as civilians.  They  could apply for 2, 4, or 6-year temporary, non-pensionable appointments, with compensation in the case of redundancy.  Their terms of service were the same as those for civilian employees of the Commission, i.e. standard Civil Service salary rates plus the Civil Service War Bonus, Control Commission Allowance, non-taxable Foreign Service Allowance, and accommodation and rations on Army scales – free up to the end of September 1948 (see next chapter, Conditions of Service).  The terms were, perhaps, particularly attractive to those whose war-time military service had disrupted their previous careers, and whose job prospects might be limited in the uncertain post-war employment climate.  Unsurprisingly, there was a good response; so good that, as the Control Commission told the three Service Ministries in March 1946, the number of civilian appointments available was greatly reduced.[38]  By August 1946, 83% of 232 newly appointed CCG officers were from the military, the vast majority from the Army.[39]  One of those was Naval Lieutenant Bill Yeadell, who had applied for a job with the Commission in January 1946 while serving in the Pacific.  He had worked before the war as a stock-checker for the printer & publisher Wyman’s, but now had a wife and growing family to support, so CCG seemed like a good opportunity.[40] 

 

‘Ad Hocs’

 

There were special challenges in securing the services of eminent candidates to fill the topmost positions.  There were not many of these, but they included, for example, senior railway engineer R M J Inglis, who headed CCG Transportation Division, mining engineer Henry Collins, renowned  educationalist Robert Birley, and industrialist Sir Cecil Weir.  It was recognised that these people, as well as top-flight barristers, and police Chief Constables, would not be willing to interrupt their careers to serve on standard Civil Service remuneration terms.  As discussed in the next chapter, Working for CCG Part II, Conditions of Service, they were eventually recruited on individually negotiated, ‘ad hoc’ terms, the name by which they became known.[41],[42]   Although their terms were never made public, their exalted status was soon understood.  One small boy was heard to say to a playmate: “What’s your Daddy?  Mine’s an ‘ad hoc’”.[43]

 

Skills, Experience and Training

 

As discussed in the Introduction, CCG(BE)’s task of supporting and guiding the Zone’s economic, industrial, social and political regeneration required a range of skills and experience well beyond those that a traditional occupying power might be expected to field.  Appendix C lists the wide range of jobs available to CCG applicants in 1945, including appointments in the fields of commercial and foreign trade policy, building and chemical industries, fuel, power & public utilities, food and agriculture, aircraft & shipbuilding/repair, engineering, transport, health, local government, post and telecommunications, education, legal, administration of justice, manpower, finance, information and public relations.  The requirements for some jobs were specified in greater detail than others.  In health, the requirement was simply for “medical officers and lay officers with good experience of Public Health Administration”; while posts and telecommunications positions required men “with a sound practical experience in the design, manufacture, installation and/or maintenance and operation of telecommunications systems including telephone, telegraph and radio and with a sound technical background.”[44] 

 

Sometimes formal qualifications were specified. The Transport branch required engineers to have a degree or membership of a professional body; young men must have reached Higher School Certificate standard in science subjects to obtain a job in the Posts and Telecommunications branch; and qualified barristers or solicitors were required for the Legal branch.  But there was also an emphasis on experience: intelligence and liaison officers in the transport sector “should have general knowledge of all forms of transport and “be able to talk and think in appropriate terms.  A candidate for any post cannot always be judged by whether or not he possesses ‘letters’ (meaning education certificates).  It is the experience and position gained during employment with important and successful organisations that counts and this requires very careful judgment during selection”. 

 

To the extent that recruits lacked the necessary technical skills for their jobs, it was for individual CCG Divisions to arrange functional training but, in December 1944, it was decided to make use of the months while large numbers were awaiting deployment to provide, in addition to pre-departure depot facilities (equipment, inoculation, documentation etc), training in general topics covering the process of control in Germany, as well as European and world problems.[45]  Notably, no German language training was envisaged, although this was a specified requirement for some jobs.  After deployment, a CCG College was established in Germany and continued to provide general training until the end of 1948.  Appendix D describes the CCG Training School and Depot, and its successor in Germany, the CCG College. 

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CCG’s German Employees

 

CCG employed German personnel from the outset, including Displaced Persons (DPs) to assist in administering the DP camps.  The numbers grew rapidly: by the end of 1946 the total of German and DP employees was 92,840, and a year later the figure had risen to 126,466, before declining to around 7,500 by early 1953. [46],[47]   The majority of Germans worked as clerks, typists, domestic workers and drivers, and as skilled or unskilled labourers; but some served at higher levels in the economic and legal branches and as interpreters.[48]   In the early post-war years job prospects for Germans were poor, and CCG jobs were highly sought after; interviewees 70 years later still remember that a job with the British meant security for the entire family.  And CCG regarded German employees as helpful in influencing the wider German population to view the British occupiers in a positive light although, as discussed on page 16, the perceived British reluctance to devolve authority to the Germans was sometimes compared unfavourably with the more flexible American approach.

 

NOTE: FURTHER WORK IS IN PROGRESS ON THIS SECTION

Quality of CCG appointees

 

There were worries from the outset about the Control Commission’s ability to attract good quality staff.  On a visit to HQ 21 Army Group in Brussels in October 1944, concerns were reported about CCG civilians working with the Civil Affairs units.  It was claimed that, although well-meaning, their quality was not high: only those in the Public Safety and PTT (Posts, Telephones and Telegraphs) fields were considered real experts.[49]. 

 

At a high-level FO meeting in September 1944[50], it was stressed that men of the highest calibre should be employed in the first year, “so that the first impression on the German was the right one”, but the Treasury warned that such men would not be released by Departments unless the Control Commission was accorded high priority.  The concerns were not only confined to senior staff.  The previous month, the Control Commission, appealing for Treasury for help in appointing junior staff, explained that they would eventually be required for service in Berlin, and must be “such as will make a good impression on the Germans”.  Special steps would be needed because, judging by standard of recent temporary recruits to the Home Civil Service (author’s italics), such staff would not be obtainable either in quality or quantity by normal methods of recruitment.[51]   A further letter in November also expressed anxiety that, without a strong nucleus of civil servants carefully chosen for their ability and keenness, the Commissions would lack the cadre of first-class people, trained in departmental procedure, which was considered essential for effective control of Germany and Austria. [52] 

 

Such expectations were probably unrealistic, and  the quality of staff continued to be a concern.  In early 1946 a COGA official thought that, desperate though the staff shortage was, if volunteers were called for, applications were likely to come from second-rate officers, “promoted during the war and now more or less redundant in their present rank” (author’s italics).[53]  General Kirby himself was under few illusions: “there would be a considerable fringe of persons of a somewhat difficult habit of mind who would not be very much influenced by a sense of public service.  Some of these people would, however, be good at their jobs; they would also be well aware that their employment was financially pretty profitable and the only way to keep them would be some appeal to self-interest.”[54] 

 

The Control Commission’s efforts to recruit good quality staff was a challenge for several reasons.  First, the lack of long-term contracts and career paths made CCG unattractive to those – often the most able - who had better prospects.  Second, as we have seen, Government Departments were reluctant to part with their best staff, and tended to release only those whom they did not want to keep, who were often the least able.  Third, although service in Germany later came to be seen as comfortable, this was not the case at the outset: appointments were unaccompanied, living conditions were sometimes spartan, with inadequate heating, lighting and hot water; and there were anxieties about living among a potentially hostile German population, as well among hundreds of refugees and displaced persons.  Finally, CCG’s public image was poor.  As will be recounted in a later Section, pCCG employees were frequently caricatured as shirkers who enjoyed undeservedly inflated salaries, cheap alcohol and cigarettes, and were provided with subsidised accommodation at a time when the British population was struggling to make ends meet in post-war austerity conditions.  The press relished running stories that fed these negative perceptions, which persisted throughout CCG’s lifetime.  Chairing an internal FOGS discussion about manpower reductions in 1948, Lord Pakenham, the then Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster and Minister responsible for FOGS and CCG, cited a public demand for “a reduction in quantity and increase in quality of staff”.[55]  

 

Was the quality of Control Commission personnel significantly worse than that of other government departments?  At this distance, there is no way of knowing, although the italicised comments in the foregoing paragraphs suggest that CCG probably contained no greater number of lazy inefficient dullards than those to be found in other government Departments that had been rapidly created or expanded during the War.  That was certainly the view of one contemporary observer, who noted that CCG Divisions such as Political and Manpower, where there was a core of regular civil servants, proved the most successful[56].   What can be said more confidently is that recruitment procedures designed for ‘normal times’ were not up to the job of finding, selecting and appointing within a very few months the enormous numbers required for the administration of the British Zone.

 

Cutting down

 

War-time planners had anticipated a ten year occupation but, as described in the Organisation and Functions section, the nature of the Control Commission’s task altered rapidly as the pace at which authority was restored to the Germans accelerated, the Soviet threat increased, and the UK’s grim economic situation necessitated the imposition of severe financial constraints.  Almost as soon as CCG reached its peak of almost 26,000 in January 1947, numbers began to decline rapidly.  As early as March 1946 Military Governor Sir Brian Robertson predicted that some 20,000 posts could be shed by the end of the following financial year (1946/47),[57] and, as shown in the graph on page [2], CCG numbers dropped rapidly from a peak of 25,700 in January 1947 to around 4,000 at the end of 1950.  

 

The run-down was not straightforward.  CCG was attempting to reduce numbers while simultaneously supporting the development of the new West German Government which would take office in September 1949 and preparing to establish the UK High Commission which would replace CCG when Military Government came to an end.  This meant that the rate at which individual Divisions could be reduced would vary.  Some functions, such as RD&R (Reparations, Deliveries & Restitution) and Prisoners of War and Displaced Persons, would be self-eliminating, but those on which BAOR was dependent, such as Intelligence, and Posts &Telecommunications, would still require some continued British control.  Moreover, there were new or expanded functions, such as Civil Aviation.[58] 

 

Many CCG staff were on temporary contracts and could be let go as these came to an end, but redundancies were also required, because the timing of end-of-contract departures did not always align with changes to CCG’s mission so, while overall numbers were reducing, some recruitment was still necessary.  This meant that, awkwardly, redundant staff were sometimes returning to UK at the same time as others, some in the same grade, were coming out to start work in CCG.    A telegram from Lübbecke to FO German Section in June 1947 reported that just such a situation was about to arise in respect of around 1,000 staff for whom recruitment demands had been placed, laying the Commission open to damaging criticism[59].  Nevertheless, Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick informed Foreign Secretary Bevin in May 1949 that CCG would be reduced from its present 12,000 to 6,500 by the end of the year.  Progress was slow: the large volume of redundancies created major administrative and logistical problems, since the system was only capable of processing 500-600 cases a month.[60]  Between May and July 1949 only 500 redundancy notices had been issued, leaving 3,500 warning notices to be issued in the following seven weeks to meet the 31.12.49 target.[61]

 

The sizeable Foreign Office German Section (FOGS, previously Control Office for Germany and Austria, COGA) was also under pressure to reduce.  From 875 in April 1946, the London-based end of the Control Commission had risen within a year to 2,277.[62]  The physical distance between FOGS and CCG inevitably meant some duplication. For example, the Control Commission’s Personnel functions were split between London and Lübbe name="_ftnref63" title="">[63]  Such arguments are sometimes still heard from civil servants resisting relocation from Whitehall.  

 

In the end, Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin was able to offer the Treasury a reduction of FOGS staff from 1,758 to 1,390 by 1.4.49, albeit this represented a reduction of only 21% compared with CCG’s 31% reduction over the same period,  and in October, Kirkpatrick was able to report that it was intended to “liquidate” FOGS altogether, and transfer responsibility for the High Commission to a Foreign Office German Department composed of only three departments compared with the present thirteen: establishments & finance; political; and economic,. [64],[65]

 

Could CCG numbers have been reduced faster? Perhaps not although, with hindsight, it had been sensible to place CCG personnel on temporary contracts, despite drawbacks in terms of being able to recruit high quality staff.  Or was it done too fast?  Sir Brian Robertson had warned, when promising to reduce by 20,000 staff by April 1947, that handing over to the Germans involved risks, some of which were being taken against the advice of Intelligence staff.  Food shortages were a continuing problem: no–one could do a full day’s work on a diet of 1,000 calories, and if the Germans working for the British could not be given more food “our machine will break”, even without further ‘Germanisation’.  In the end, the machine did not break.

 

CCG numbers were never reduced to zero.  The residual employees were absorbed into  the High Commission when it came into being on 21 September 1949.  Some of them, as will be described in a future section What happened Next? then transferred to the new British Embassy when West Germany became fully sovereign in 1955, while others transferred to the War Office to form the Joint Services Liaison Organisation and the British Frontier Service.

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Conclusion

 

CCG was regularly criticised for being a bloated organization.  Why did it require 26,000 officials to administer the British Zone when it had only taken 1,500 or so to run the whole of India?[66]  More relevantly, CCG was compared unfavourably with its American counterpart, OMGUS (Office of the Military Government US), which appeared to manage with only around half as many staff as CCG.  What accounted for the difference?  The Control Commission was asked to come up with comparative figures.  This proved difficult because, as described in Appendix E, the two organisations were structured and staffed quite differently.  CCG personnel included the 3,780-strong Intelligence Division, as well as 6,500 administration and support staff, tasks that were performed in the US Zone by the US Army or by German employees. It was claimed that, excluding these elements, and taking account of the heavier post-war rehabilitation burden placed on CCG in the heavily industrialised and more badly damaged British Zone, CCG and OMGUS would have been broadly comparable.[67]   As a tetchy Control Commission official put it, the Americans’ task was simple compared to the British: “they have not got the heavy industries; they have not got the densely populated areas; and it is child-play for them by comparison to hurry on the process of handing over… to the Germans”.[68] 

 

Neither the explanation nor the numbers seem wholly convincing, but it is true that the Americans were ready to devolve authority and responsibility to the Germans more quickly than the British who, perhaps partly because of their colonial instincts, but mainly because of a greater anxiety to ensure Germany’s long-term rehabilitation, felt they needed to invest more time and expertise to embed democratic principles and institutional practices.  That said, it would be difficult to argue that there were no instances of overstaffing in an organisation that was created (and then dismantled) so hastily in such turbulent circumstances.  Even at the time, there was criticism, which will be discussed in Section 6, Perceptions of CCG. 

 

CCG was probably not exceptional: as recorded above, the Foreign Office German Section was also regarded as overstaffed, and the rapid war-time expansion of many other Government Departments and, indeed, the Armed Forces was prone to similar criticisms.  Hence the Government’s demand in 1946 for stringent reductions in the size of the Civil Service.[69]   But CCG was a costly organisation and a very visible target for public, press and parliamentary scrutiny.  Not for long though: due to its short life span, the issue faded from view within a few years although, as discussed in Appendix A to the Foreword, its poor image may have contributed to the fact that no official history of the Control Commission was produced.

​

 

Footnotes

[1] Exchange of minutes between Ashton-Gwatkin and Sir W Strang 19-25.9.44 National Archives File FO936/362

[2] Minutes of FO meeting chaired by Oliver Harvey on 5.9.44, attended by Sir W Strang, EAC; Maj Gen Anderson, DCA WO; Maj Gen Kirby; Brig Gueterbock, Col Maxwell, Norfolk House; Sir W Eady, Messrs Chance, Playfair, Treasury; Messrs Turner, Rayner, Enemy Branch; Mr Gunn, MoLNS; Messrs Gwatkin, Mack, Troutbeck, Chapman, Andrews, Ward, Allen, Dean, Vyvyan, FO.  National Archives File 936/362  

[3] FSV Donnison Civil Affairs & Military Government North-West Europe 1944-1946 p257.  Hereafter ‘Donnision’

[4] Donnison p251

[5] 8.12.52 Draft History of CCG Recruitment.  National Archives File FO936/672

[6] ‘Establishment”: a term used throughout Government and the Military meaning the authorised staff complement

[7] Appendix B to 9th CCG Progress Report, March 1945. National Archives File FO1005/1634

[8] Report of General Kirby, Deputy Commissioner (Military) for July-August 1944, 5.9.44.  National Archives File FO1005/1634

[9] 11.6.45 General Kirby to J R Wade.  National Archives File FO936/183

[10] Sir W Eady speaking at 5.9.44 Foreign Office meeting.  National Archive File FO936/362

[11] The other three deficiencies were: lack of a deputy Commander-in-Chief (who could not be appointed until the Commander-in-Chief had been designated); lack of any inter-Allied agreement on directives to be given to Commanders in Chief, or orders, proclamations etc. to be issued to the Germans in the event of collapse or surrender; lack of either an inter-Allied or British view on the economic policy to be adopted in Germany

[12] Control Commission 10th Monthly Progress Report, April 1945.  National Archives FO1005/1634

[13] Field Marshal Montgomery letter to Sir Arthur Street, PUS/FO, 22.1.46.  National Archives File FO936/362

[14] Memorandum from Major General S W Kirby submitted to PUS/WO and copied informally to H E Rayner, FO on 25.8.44.  National Archives File FO936/230

[15] Letter from Major General S W Kirby to Major General A V Anderson, DCA, War Office, 6.9.44.  National Archives File FO936/230

[16] Mr Gunn, MOLNS.  Minutes of meeting chaired by FO on 5.9.44.  National Archives FO936/362

[17]  Oliver Lyttleton, Minister of Production, as reported by Michael Balfour in Four-Power Control in Germany and Austria 1945-1946 p100

[18] The Treasury cites the case of two members of staff of “the Foreign Office organisation engaged on extremely important work…which the Prime Minister has personally directed should be given the very highest priority… if the organisation to which Doctor Cobbett belongs [Bletchley?] were to shut down the Control Commission job might be indefinitely postponed” Letter from Thompson to Aynsley, 2.12.44.  National Archives FO936/362

[19] Sir William Eady 2nd Permanent Secretary, HM Treasury.  Minutes of FO meeting held on 5.9.44.  National Archives File FO936/362

[20] Rt Hon G H Hall MP, on behalf of Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to Rt Hon Sir John Anderson, Chancellor of the Exchequer 14.9.44.  National Archives File FO936/362

[21] Sir John Anderson, Chancellor of the Exchequer to Rt Hon G H Hall MP 19.9.44.  National Archives File FO936/362

[22] A rare reference to women - personnel were invariably referred to as men, unless specifically identified as female, e.g. ATS, female typists. The issue of gender is discussed in the next chapter

[23] 27.2.45 Sir John Anderson, Chancellor of the Exchequer to Ministers. National Archives File FO926/362

[24] 24.1.45 Applications received from Ministries and Departments.  National Archives File FO936/398

[25] Refusal by Government Departments to Release Staff for the Commission National Archives File FO936/398

[26] Letter from General Kirby to COGA Establishment Branch, 5.3.46.  National Archives FO936/401

[27] 27.7.45 Letter from COGA to L L H Thompson, Treasury.  National Archives File FO936/397

[28] 22.1.46  Letter from Field Marshal Montgomery to Sir Arthur Street.  National Archive File FO936/362

[29] letter from Maj Gen Kirby to O Harvey, FO, copied to Wilcox, Treasury, 29.8.44.  National Archives File FO936/362

[30] Under the terms of the Military Training Act 1939, all male British subjects aged between 20 and 21 were liable for call up for a year's training in the armed forces. Following the outbreak of the Second World War, the Military Training Act 1939 was superseded by the National Service (Armed Forces) Act 1939, which imposed a liability to service with the armed forces on men aged between 18 and 41 years.  These were further extended in 1941 by the National Service Act 1941, which extended the liability to service in civil defence, and the National Service (No 2) Act 1941, which imposed on all persons of either sex a general obligation to service in the armed forces, civil defence or industry and extended the upper age limit of liability to service in the armed forces to 51 years.  Source: Wikipedia

[31] Donnison, p257

[32] Note of a meeting with MoLNS attended by Aynesly, R W Luce (MoLNS) and others, 14.2.45.  National Archives File FO936/362

[33] Kirkpatrick to Oliver Harvey, 16.2.45.  National Archives File FO936/362

[34] Ironically, Luce subsequently became the Head of CCG’s Manpower Division

[35] Obituary, New York Times 26.5.1964

[36] 24.2.45 Cadogan, FO letter to Ince, MOLNS.  National Archives File FO936/362

[37] ACI1484, 29.12.45; AFO396 (CW76378/45) 17.1.46; AMOA/73 24.1.46

[38] 17.3.46 Letters from Control Commission to Admiralty, War Office and Air Ministry [File no?]

[39] 31.8.46 British Zone Review: How the Commission is Staffed

[40] Author’s father

[41] 16.8.44 Letter from General Kirby the H G Rayner, FO.  National Archives File FO936/362

[42] 7.10.44 Note of FO meeting with Treasury & WO National Archives File FO936/362

[43] Four Power Control in Germany and Austria P108, Michael Balfour

[44] Appendix D to Control Service for Germany, BAOR Orders No. 103 7th September 1945

[45] Draft Training Policy Directive No. 1. National Archives File FO1032/461,

[46] CCG Monthly Report 2/3 March 1947.  Imperial War Museum

[47] CCG Monthly Report 3/1 January 1948.  Imperial War Museum

[48] September 1953 Labour Analysis Return & Graphs.  National Archives File FO936/1026

[49] 17.10.44 Report on Visit to HQ 21 Army Group, Lt Col Sir T St Vincent Troubridge.  National Archives File FO1032/444

[50] Minutes of FO meeting chaired by Oliver Harvey on 5.9.44, attended by Sir W Strang, EAC; Maj Gen Anderson, DCA WO; Brigadier Gueterbock, Col Maxwell, Norfolk House; Sir W Eady, Messrs Chance, Playfair, Treasury; Messrs Turner, Rayner, Enemy Branch; Mr Gunn, MOLNS; Messrs Gwatkin, Mack, Troutbeck, Chapman, Andrews, Ward, Allen, Dean, Vivyen, National Achives File FO936/362

[51] 9.8.44 letter from H G Rayner, Control Commission, to H C Potter, Treasury.  National Archives File FO936/362

[52] 28.11.44 letter from Aynsley, FO, to LL Thompson, Treasury.  National Archives File 936/362

[53] 6.3.46. Minute from G H G Anderson to G Kirwan.  National Archives File FO936/368

[54] 6.7.45 Major General Kirby at a meeting with the War Office.  National Archives File FO936/362

[55] [Ref needed]

[56] “A new organization takes time to settle down; despite the vigilance of interview boards, some ‘duds’ creep in and have to be displaced… but time to settle down was what the Commission did not have” Michael Balfour: Four-Power Control in Germany and Austria 1945-1946 pp101-102

[57] 13.3.46 letter from Sir Brian Robertson to Sir Arthur Street, Permanent Secretary, COGA.  National Archives File FO936/362

[58] 24.4.49 Note of Ostenwalde meeting between Sir Brian Robertson and Ivone Kirkpatrick.  National Archives File FO936/844

[59] Inward Telegram from CCG Lübbecke to Foreign Office German Section 16.6.47.  National Archives File FO936/411

[60] 6.5.49 Ivone Kirkpatrick to Secretary of State, FO.  National Archive File FO936/844

[61] 11.7.49 & 23.8.49 CCG to FO telegrams. National Archives File FO936/844

[62] FOGS nos. 1946-1949.  National Archives File FO936/179

[63] FOGS meeting chaired by Lord Pakenham, Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, 1948.  National Archives File FO936/179

[64] 3.5.48 Cabinet Memorandum submitted by Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. National Archives File FO936/179

[65] 24.10.49 Kirkpatrick to Bridges.  National Archive File FO936/189

[66] 29.7.47 Oliver Lyttleton MP, Hansard, debate on Germany and Austria

[67] Michael Balfour Four-Power Control in Germany and Austria 1945-1946 p102

[68] 23.12.46 Brigadier H W H Armytage to K D Kirwan, COGA.  National Archives File 936/263

[69] 10.12.46 Letter from EE Bridges, Treasury Permanent Secretary, to all Permanent Secretaries.  National Archives File FO936/188

 [Dg1]This is an enormous number to find

 [Dg2]Anathema to MoL (and Tsy!)

 [Dg3]even more unhelpful

 [Dg4]Is this a veiled threat to quit the job?

 [Dg5]The PM will be told that MoL is to blame